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STANDARDS OWNERSHIP AND COMPETITION POLICY
Herbert Hovenkamp1
ABSTRACT
Antitrust law is a blunt instrument for dealing with many claims of
anticompetitive standard setting. Antitrust fact finders lack the sophistication
to pass judgment on the substantive merits of a standard. In any event,
antitrust is not a roving mandate to question bad standards. It requires an
injury to competition, and whether the minimum conditions for competitive
harm are present can often be determined without examining the substance
of the standard itself.
When government involvement in standard setting is substantial
antitrust challenges should generally be rejected. The petitioning process in
a democratic system protects even bad legislative judgments from collateral
attack. In any event, antitrust's purpose is to correct private markets. It is
not a general corrective for political processes that have gone awry. The
best case for antitrust liability occurs when the government has somehow
been deceived into adopting a standard that it would not have adopted had it
known the true facts. Even then, nonantitrust remedies such as equitable
estoppel are probably a superior solution.

1. Ben V. & Dorothy Willie Professor of Law and History, University of Iowa
College of Law.

Hovenkamp, Standards and Antitrust

Page 2

Introduction
Antitrust's purpose is to protect competition, while giving firms
reasonable freedom to innovate, develop, produce and distribute their
products. While standard setting can enable firms to improve along all of
these avenues of business progress, it can also facilitate both of antitrust's
twin evils: collusion and exclusion. This essay explores some of the ways
antitrust policy can evaluate claims that privately promulgated standards are
anticompetitive without hindering socially beneficial conduct.
For antitrust purposes a standard is usefully defined as a set of
technical specifications that provides a common design for some product or
process.2 While the focus of standard setting today is high technology
industries with significant technological sophistication, the history of antitrust
reaches back to standards that were less complex. The Supreme Court's
first antitrust decision on the merits involved a joint running arrangement
among railroads that included a significant standard setting component. The
Supreme Court condemned the arrangement as nothing more than a cartel,
ignoring the lower courts' conclusions that the agreement was intended
primarily to coordinate schedules and standardize freight classifications,
cargo transfer protocols, and the like.3
In some ways standards resemble intellectual property rights.
Economically, the increased welfare that they produce is largely a
consequence of product improvement, not of prices that are brought closer
2. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Mark D. Janis and Mark A. Lemley, IP and
Antitrust: an Analysis of Antitrust Principles Applied to Intellectual Property
Law '35.1a (2002 & 2006 Supp.). On antitrust and standard setting
generally, see id., Ch. 35. On standard setting more generally, see David J.
Teece & Edward F. Sherry, Standards Setting and Antitrust, 87 Minn. L.Rev.
1913 (2003); Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights and Standard
Setting Organizations, 90 Cal.L.Rev. 1889 (2002); Mark A. Lemley & David
McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects, 86 Cal. L. Rev.
479, 551 (1998).
3. United States v. TransBMissouri Freight Ass'n., 58 Fed. 58, 79B80 (8th
Cir.1893), reversed, 166 U.S. 290, 17 S.Ct. 540 (1897). See also Herbert
Hovenkamp, Regulatory Conflict in the Gilded Age: Federalism and the
Railroad Problem, 97 Yale. L.J. 1017, 1041 (1988). Even the setting track
gauges in nineteenth century railroading promoted a standards battle. See
Herbert Hovenkamp, The Antitrust Enterprise: Principle and Execution 284
(2006).
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to marginal cost. As a result, some of the same antinomies exist between
antitrust and standard setting as exist between antitrust and IP rights.
Effective promulgation of standards may involve a certain amount of
coordination of output by rivals and a certain amount of market exclusion -both things that antitrust generally abhors. Further, the development of
appropriate standards is often an R&D activity, characterized by up front
costs and amortization over long time periods.
Standards also share one important characteristic with technology
choices generally: they can become path dependent. Once a standard is
adopted and technology designed around the standard, switching costs
increase, making the exercise of durable market power possible. Standards
are often subject to significant network effects. As a result, they acquire
increased value per user as they are more widely adopted.4 This can
facilitate the exercise of market power, because the standard's owners will
be able to charge more for products compatible with the standard, or
perhaps for access to the standard itself. Some but certainly not all
standards are capable of conferring significant market power. In certain
cases an "insider" with respect to some standard has a significant market
advantage over outsiders, and thus may be in a position to set a price
substantially above costs. This can happen if duplication of the standard is
costly and compliance with it is essential for market success. For example,
when compatibility with the standard is technologically essential, or if a
government rule requires that a specific standard be followed, standards can
have significant exclusionary power provided that they are difficult to
appropriate. While IP rights do not inherently confer significant market
power,5 some IP rights do, particularly if they control effective access to a
market. The same thing is largely true of standards. Some are easily
complied with, widely shared among a large group of firms, or unnecessary
for successful competition in the market.6 Such standards are completely
4. For example, the model building code at issue in Allied Tube & Conduit
Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 494 (1988), was a standard with
considerable exclusionary power because it was adopted almost verbatim by
thousands of communities across the country.
5. See Illinois Tool Works, Inc. ("ITW") v. Independent Ink, Inc., ___ S.Ct.
___, 2006 WL 468729 (March 1, 2006) (upsetting half century old antitrust
presumption in the federal courts that a patent in a tying product gave its
owner sufficient market power to make a tie unlawful).
6. See, e.g., Foundation for Interior Design Education Research v.
Savannah College of Art & Design, 244 F.3d 521 (6th Cir. 2001) (privately
promulgated accreditation standards for interior design schools not
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consistent with robust competition. However, others are tightly controlled
and effective access may be restricted to a small number of firms.7
Standards can also have some of the other consumption
characteristics shared by IP rights. For example, an additional firm can
adopt a standard without taking any production away from the standard's
owner, other than the right to obtain royalties by licensing the standard. At
the same time many standards are not licensed at all, but are given away in
the sense that anyone who is willing to conform to them is invited into the
relevant area of enterprise.8
The most likely economic effect of private standard setting is
increased social value. By promulgating standards producers can increase
both horizontal and vertical compatibility. "Horizontal" compatibility refers to
compatibility as between competing goods that are subject to a standard.
For example, a user can substitute one brand of compact disc, computer
monitor, or shotgun shell for another in the same computer or shotgun.
"Vertical" compatibility refers to the ability of goods to use the same inputs.
For example, all Windows computers run the same software, or all
automobiles burn the same gasoline. Standards can also reduce consumer
search costs and increase consumer confidence, significantly reduce the
costs of input suppliers, make networking possible or at least much more
efficient, or facilitate the achievement of scale economies. As a result there
anticompetitive because there was no evidence that "accredited" schools
had any market advantages over non-accredited ones); George R. Whitten,
Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 508 F.2d 547, 558 (1st Cir.1974)
(private standard setting for swimming pool heating and circulatory systems
did not restrain trade because it appeared that most builders ignored the
standard, which had no legal force).
7. E.g., Union Oil Co., ___ F.T.C. ___, 5 CCH Trade Reg. Rep. &15618
(FTC, July 6, 2004) (patented standard for cleaner burning gasoline
mandated by state law); Rambus, Inc., 5 CCH Trade Reg. Rep. &15556
(FTC, Feb. 23, 2004) (patented standard for RAM chips).
8. See, e.g., United States v. Realty Multi-List, 629 F.2d 1351 (5th Cir.
1980); Brown v. Indianapolis Board of Realtors, 1977-1 Trade Cases
&61,435 (S.D.Ind., 1977, unreported), both of which note the generally open
standards for membership on real estate brokerage boards. Cf. Visa U.S.A.,
Inc. v. SCFC ILC, Inc., 36 F.3d 958, 961 (10th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 515
U.S. 1151 (1995) (Visa joint venture open to any institution that qualifies for
FDIC insurance).
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should be no antitrust presumption against standards, even those that are
jointly set by competing firms.
Nevertheless, standards can also facilitate both of the evils that
concern antitrust law -- namely, collusion and exclusion. When standards
are created or enforced by competing producers collusion is possible. When
they are used to keep some producers out of the market anticompetitive
exclusion is possible.
Thus antitrust rules for standard setting will permit the great majority
of standard setting activities to proceed. But they will also identify some
instances where standards are used anticompetitively. Antitrust performs
this function best by identifying clearly what the dangers are, specifying the
conditions under which those dangers are likely to be realized, and then
paying special attention to standard setting in situations that meet those
conditions.
Importantly, if the standards in question are complex, the antitrust
decision maker must avoid becoming overly involved in the substantive
merits of the standard itself. Antitrust tribunals, particular juries, lack the
technical skills to answer such questions as whether chiropractic is really a
legitimate form of medical practice,9 whether a particular medical procedure
is safe and effective,10 or whether a particular engineering standard is
necessary for passenger limousines.11 Well formulated antitrust rules should
try to evaluate standard setting whenever possible by avoiding these difficult
technological issues.

9. E.g., Wilk v. American Med. Ass'n, 895 F.2d 352 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
496 U.S. 927 (1990) (condemning AMA standard setting rule that excluding
chiropractors).
10. E.g., Schachar v. American Academy of Ophthalmology, Inc., 870 F.2d
397 400 (7th Cir.1989) (radial keratotomy); Hassan v. Spicer, 2006 WL
228958 (E.D.N.Y., Jan 31, 2006) (nuclear cardiology).
11. See Craftsmen Limousine, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co. 363 F.3d 761 (8th Cir.
2004). See also Eliason Corp. v. National Sanitation Foundation, 614 F.2d
126, 139 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 826 (1980) (commercial
refrigerators); Consolidated Metal Prod., Inc. v. American Petroleum Institute,
846 F.2d 284, 296 (5th Cir.1988) (oil well drilling heads); Moore v. Boating
Industry Ass'ns., 819 F.2d 693 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 854 (1987)
(submersible boat trailer tail lights).
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In the great majority of cases an antitrust tribunal can evaluate
standards by looking, not at the substantive "reasonableness" of the
standard itself, but at such issues as the number and identity of the persons
making the standard, the exclusionary power that the standard generates, or
other signs of the standard's potential to facilitate collusion or exclude rivals
and facilitate the exercise of market power. This is not to say that antitrust
can always avoid substantive evaluations of standards, but rather that it need
do so in only a few situations.
The history of antitrust policy suggests that it has been unreasonably
hostile toward private standard setting. Nonetheless, many of the early
standard setting antitrust cases provoked legitimate competitive concerns,
and some where nothing more than fronts for naked collusion.
Standards, Product Differentiation, and Collusion
One explanation for antitrust's traditional hostility toward joint standard
setting is that many of the early cases involved obvious, often ham handed,
attempts at price fixing. This seemed to create a mindset that found jointly
set standards to be anticompetitive.
Standards facilitate collusion by minimizing product or service
differentiation, or by making product specifications or terms readily
observable across sellers. Cartels are much more difficult to manage when
products are differentiated or sold subject to unique specifications. The
fewer variables that cartel members must observe, the easier it is to stabilize
a cartel equilibrium.12 These observations generally apply to both "explicit"
price fixing and to the more informal methods of collusion that we generally
associate with oligopoly industries.
Antitrust history is fairly filled with attempts to facilitate collusion by
standardizing products, terms of sale, delivery, or other components of a
transaction. In Standard Sanitary a cartel of bathroom pottery manufacturers
was led by a patentee who licensed its finishing process to other cartel
12. See F.M. Scherer & D. Ross, Industrial Market Structure and Economic
Performance 279 (3d ed. 1990); Richard A. Posner, Antitrust Law 76-77 (2d
ed. 2001); Herbert Hovenkamp, The Antitrust Enterprise: Principle and
Execution 132 (2006). On oligopoly pricing under product differentiation, see
W.K. Viscusi, J.M. Vernon, & J.E. Harrington, Jr., Economics of Regulation
and Antitrust 108-112 (3d ed. 2000); Herbert Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust
Policy: the Law of Competition and its Practice ''4.1a, 4.2a, 4.4b (3d ed.
2005).
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members. The cartel then designated goods that did not employ this
process as "seconds" and required cartel members either to destroy them or
ship them abroad in a fairly obvious attempt to reduce the output sold on the
domestic market.13 In addition, the cartel fixed the price of all the goods that
were designated first quality.
In the more famous National Macaroni case the defendants
responded to a temporary shortage of durum semolina wheat by setting a
product standard for pasta that called for 50% durum semolina and 50%
inferior farina wheat.14 The standard was intended to suppress the price of
durum semolina, and thus reduce the defendants' production costs.15
13. Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States, 226 U.S. 20, 41 (1912).
Cf. Milk & Ice Cream Can Inst. v. FTC, 152 F.2d 478, 482-483 (7th Cir. 1946)
(noting testimony "that sales of 'firsts' as 'seconds' was a method of indirect
price cutting.").
14. Nat. Macaroni Mfrs. Ass'n., 65 F.T.C. 583 (1964), enforced, 345 F.2d
421 (7th Cir. 1965).
The recent and troublesome decision in Golden Bridge Technology,
Inc. v. Nokia, Inc., ___ F.Supp.2d ___, 2006 WL 385222 (E.D.Tex. Feb. 17,
2006) falls closest to this category, at least in the eyes of the court. The
plaintiff complained that it developed a patented technology for cellular
phones which it wished to license to the cell phone companies. Acting
through their standard setting organization, however, the cell phone
companies adopted standards that excluded the technology and thus
avoided the license fees. The court refused to dismiss a complaint that
adoption of the standard amounted to a per se antitrust boycott. While a
standard setting organization is free to adopt a lower cost standard, the effect
of its adoption may be to prevent individual members from licensing the
disapproved technology even if they wanted to. Nevertheless, antitrust's per
se rule is reserved for practices that are so clearly anticompetitive that
detailed inquiry into the market structure or the effects of the practice are
unnecessary. This hardly seems like such a case. The court analogized to
Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 494 (1988),
discussed infra. But in Allied Tube the plaintiff was not asking other
manufacturers in the organization to license its technology, it simply wanted
market approval side-by-side with other products.
15. Contrast Tag Mfrs. Inst. v. FTC, 174 F.2d 452, 461-462 (1st Cir. 1949),
which refused to condemn a trade association's rules that both standardized
the format and design of shipping tags and required detailed reporting
concerning prices. The FTC had argued that the product standardization
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Similarly the C-O-Two decision seems to have involved nothing more than a
naked cartel accomplished by turning a product differentiated industry into a
completely standardized one.16 The defendants made fire extinguishers that
were publicly bid to government purchasers such as schools. They agreed
on product specifications that were so detailed that the extinguishers could
not be differentiated from one another except by the manufacturer's
identification tag.17 In condemning the restraint the court found, first, that it
facilitated price fixing, and second, that the standards were completely
unnecessary to the safe and effective operation of the fire extinguishers.
Notwithstanding the obvious advantages of standardized container sizes, the
court reached the same conclusion in the Milk Institute case, which involved
agreements that standardized the sizes of milk containers when the
agreements were being used to facilitate price fixing.18
Several antitrust cases also involve standardization of terms of sale
made price collusion much easier; the court replied:
Nor is the conclusion of the Commission strengthened by its finding
that the administration of the reporting agreements "was materially
assisted by the standardization of the component parts of tags and
tag products developed and adopted under the auspices of the
respondent Institute." ... These standardizations are deemed to be to
the advantage of all concerned, including the consumer who, among
other benefits, is thereby better enabled to know what he is buying
and to make intelligent price comparisons. Of course, the detailed
standardization of tags and components which the Institute has
assisted in developing tends to make more serviceable the
information reported ... under the Tag Industry Agreement and ...
collated and disseminated among the Subscribers. But if the reporting
agreement is otherwise lawful, such enhanced usefulness of the
agreement as results from standardization would hardly infect it with
illegality.
16. C-O-Two Fire Equip. Co. v. United States, 197 F.2d 489 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 344 U.S. 892 (1952). See also United States v. Am. Radiator &
Standard Sanitary Corp., 433 F.2d 174, 185 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401
U.S. 948 (1971) (condemning standard setting agreement on household
radiators that effectively eliminated lower price, lower quality products).
17. Id. at 493.
18. Milk & Ice Cream Can Inst. v. FTC, 152 F.2d 478, 482 (7th Cir. 1946).
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and delivery. For example, in Catalano the Supreme Court condemned an
agreement that standardized credit terms for the wholesaling of beer to
retailers.19 The courts have routinely condemned "basing point" pricing and
related agreements among sellers to standardize delivery terms.20 And in
the famous 1936 Sugar Institute case the Supreme Court condemned an
agreement among sugar manufacturers to issue standardized price lists for
sugar and then to adhere to the lists while they were in force.21
To be sure, the pricing mechanism itself can be improved by standard
setting. Standardized price terms can reduce consumer search costs and
minimize fraud or misrepresentation.
Here, antitrust has taken the
administratively defensible position that for most pricing standards the risks
of collusion are simply too high in relation to the gains. As a result,
promulgation of standards concerning pricing should come from the
government.22 Indeed, even here some of the most anticompetitive of
statutory regimes are those that regulate such things as the posting of retail
liquor or wine prices, effectively permitting sellers to collude.23
19. Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643 (1980). See 12
Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law &2022 (2d ed. 2004).
20. E.g., FTC v. A. E. Staley Mfg. Co., 324 U.S. 746 (1945) (condemning an
agreed upon basing-point pricing system for the sale of glucose); Corn
Prods. Ref. Co. v. FTC, 324 U.S. 726 (1945) (similar). See also FTC v.
Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683, 696-700 (1948) (condemning agreement to
employ basing point pricing; noting its tendency to lead to complete
uniformity of pricing, particularly when the product at issue is fungible);
Clamp-All Corp. v. Cast Iron Soil Pipe Inst., 851 F.2d 478, 484-485 (1st Cir.
1988), cert denied, 488 U.S. 1007 (1989) (Breyer, J.). On the economics,
see George J. Stigler, A Theory of Delivered Price Systems, 39 Am. Econ.
Rev. 1143 (Aug. 1949); Frederic M. Scherer & David Ross, Industrial Market
Structure and Economic Performance 505-506 (3d ed. 1990); Dennis W.
Carlton, A Reexamination of Delivered Pricing Systems, 26 J.L. & Econ. 51
(1983); David Haddock, Basing-Point Pricing: Competitive v. Collusive
Theories, 72 Am. Econ. Rev. 289 (1982).
21. Sugar Institute, Inc. v. United States, 297 U.S. 553 (1936).
22. A notable exception is Cal. Dental Ass'n v. FTC (CDA), 526 U.S. 756
(1999) (advertising rules of dental association effectively ban most price
advertising and all quality advertising).
23. E.g., 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 479 U.S. 335 (1987); TFWS v. Schaefer,
242 F.3d 198 (4th Cir. 2001).
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A few of these decisions, such as Milk Institute, undoubtedly reached
too far. But most probably did not. Further, they carry a fairly important
message: product differentiation is still an important value, primarily because
consumers have different preferences but also because it makes collusion
more difficult to sustain. Standards that do no more than reduce product
differentiation in order to facilitate price matching do not provide a social
benefit.
The values of product differentiation probably do not extend to the
sizes of milk containers, however. And school children might be safer if all
fire extinguishers work exactly the same way so that teachers can reliably be
trained one time for all of them. So antitrust must tread carefully even when it
is attacking standard setting that might facilitate collusion. If standard setting
is accompanied by price fixing, as it very likely was in the C-O-Two and Milk
Institute decisions, then the antitrust tribunal can always respond by
condemning the price-fixing. But most cases are more difficult and involve
situations where standardization facilitates express or tacit collusion but the
collusion itself is evidenced only by parallel prices. In that case antitrust fact
finders must look at other factors. For example, do consumers benefit from
the standard setting? Do the standards create the kind of product
homogeneity that facilitates collusion, or do they merely regulate safety or
functionality in ways that permit significant product differentiation along other
avenues? It is also important to determine whether non-producer interests
have a significant role in the standard setting. For example, while fire
extinguisher producers have an interest in colluding on the price of fire
extinguishers, fire insurance companies do not; they are benefitted by fire
extinguishers that work as well as possible and are sold competitively.
Finally, the number of firms in the market is often important. Cartels
become much more difficult to manage as the number of significant firms in a
market rises above a dozen or so. Informal cartels, or those relying on tacit
rather than express collusion, may require even fewer. While a large number
of participants is an indicator that collusion is less likely, however, in some
cases collusive output reductions and higher prices are quite possible even
though the market has numerous competitors. This can happen when the
standard in question is itself a direct restraint on output or pricing and
violation of the standard is readily observable by other cartel members. For
example, even though the NCAA has several hundred members its rule
limiting nationally televised football games served to reduce output
anticompetitively.24 No member could surreptitiously cheat on the cartel by
24. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Oklahoma, 468 U.S. 85 (1984). At
the time of the litigation the NCAA had 850 members. Id. at 89.
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secretly televising a football game. Accordingly, the number of nationally
televised games increased significantly and TV advertising rates fell after the
rule was lifted.25 In sum, a large number of firms in the market subject to
standard setting is often relevant but need not be decisive. One must always
consider how the collusive restraint on output or price is being carried out.
Exclusion and Standard Setting
Before firms can charge monopoly prices they must be able to do two
things. The first is to coordinate the output and pricing decisions of existing
producers. The difficulty of accomplishing this ranges from nil in the case of
the monopolist, which absolutely controls its own price and output, to quite
severe if the market has a large number of firms, and particularly if the firms
use different technologies or produce differentiated products.
But firms bent on monopoly must also keep the output of others out of
the market. Standard setting can accomplish this by setting standards in
such a fashion that only a small number of compliant firms meet the
standard, or the standard is licensed to only such firms.
At the same time, if a standard setting process is at all meaningful one
or more firms will either "flunk" the standard or else have to make a
significant investment in order to comply with it. The most common antitrust
claim involving standard-setting is that it is used to limit competition by
excluding rivals, whether it be restrictive bar passage rates,26 hospital
accreditation standards that exclude chiropractors,27 surgical standards that
25. Accord Nat'l Soc'y of Prof'l Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978)
(69,000 members, of whom 12,000 were active consulting engineers
affected by the challenged canon against competitive bidding).
26. Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558 (1984) (bar exam grading standards
were promulgated by state supreme court and qualified for antitrust "state
action" immunity); Mothershed v. Justices of the Supreme Court (Arizona),
410 F.3d 602 (9th Cir. 2005) (similar).
27. Wilk v. American Med. Ass'n, 895 F.2d 352 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 496
U.S. 927 (1990) (condemning AMA rule excluding chiropractors from access
to important inputs such as hospital X-ray facilities). See also Hahn v.
Oregon Physicians' Serv., 868 F.2d 1022, 1028-1029 (9th Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 846 (1989) (exclusion of podiatrists); Schachar v. American
Academy of Ophthalmology, Inc., 870 F.2d 397 400 (7th Cir.1989)
(standards for eye surgery that allegedly discriminated against radial
keratotomy). And see Mass. School of Law at Andover, Inc. v. ABA, 107
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protect against cost cutting medical procedures,28 or building code or product
safety standards that protect incumbent firms from threatening
technologies.29 Network standards might keep some firms off the network,
perhaps imposing prohibitive costs on them in the process. Closely related
is the proprietary standard protected by intellectual property rights, whose
licensing costs imposed on rivals create a price umbrella protecting the IP
holders. Sometimes these standards are created or made enforceable with
the help of the government, thus implicating antitrust's Noerr-Pennington
doctrine, which gives a measure of quasi-constitutional protection to petitions
to the government for anticompetitive actions.30 Sometimes they are created
by private bodies which have a significant influence over government
decision-making.31
To repeat an earlier warning: Antitrust is often way outside its
competence if it attempts to evaluate standard setting by examining the
technological merits of the challenged standard. Although antitrust contains
F.3d 1026, 1032, 1037 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 907 (1997) (law
school accreditation standards that, in part, linked accreditation to professor
salaries); United States v. ABA, 60 Fed. Reg. 39,421 (1995) (consent decree
limiting ABA's ability to tie law school accreditation to faculty compensation).
28. Summit Health, Ltd. v. Pinhas, 500 U.S. 322, 341 (1991) (physician
allegedly denied staff privileges because he had developed lower cost
procedure for conducting eye surgery that required only one surgeon instead
of two).
29. Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492 (1988)
(defendant's manipulated standard setting organization in order to
disapprove plaintiff's plastic electrical conduit in order to protect market for
traditional steel conduit); Hydrolevel Corp. v. American Society of Mechanical
Engineers, Inc., 456 U.S. 556 (1982) (officer of society of mechanical
engineers participated in fraudulent scheme to discredit plaintiff's valve);
Consolidated Metal Products, Inc. v. American Petroleum Institute, 846 F.2d
284 (5th Cir. 1988) (institute made up of manufacturers and users of oil well
equipment refused to approve plaintiff's allegedly innovative and lower cost
design).
30. E.g., Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492,
494 (1988); Union Oil Co., ___ F.T.C. ___, 5 CCH Trade Reg. Rep. &15618
(FTC, July 6, 2004) (patented status for cleaner burning gasoline).
31. E.g., Allied Tube, supra; Hydrolevel, supra.
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a rule of reason, "reasonableness" in this context refers to the impact of a
standard on competition, not to the substantive reasonableness of the
standard itself. In most private antitrust cases the plaintiff seeks damages,
and as a result most of them contemplate a jury trial. Except in clear cases
of abuse, juries are not up to answering technical questions concerning the
necessity or appropriateness of a particular standard.
Concerted Standard Making and Exclusion
The antitrust problem of concerted standard setting that excludes
rivals is a half century old, including the 1943 AMA case which condemned
the AMA for adopting an "ethical" standard that forbad physicians from
working for prepaid health organizations.32 The grandparent of explicit
product safety standards cases is the 1961 Radiant Burner decision, in which
the Supreme Court sustained the complaint of a gas heater manufacturer
alleging that it was excluded from the market by an industry safety standard
that had been biased and capriciously enforced.33
Radiant Burners suggested that one should evaluate standards by
looking at the intent of those setting them. But there are better ways for
courts to proceed, and Radiant Burners itself suggests some of them. The
defendants in that case included not only competing manufacturers of gas
heaters, but also natural gas utilities and pipeline companies. One can easily
see why a competing heater manufacturer would wish to exclude a cheaper
or more efficient burner, or simply remove rivals from the market generally.
But natural gas utilities and gas pipeline companies sell a complementary
32. AMA v. United States, 317 U.S. 519, 532-533 (1943).
33. Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656
(1961) (reversing lower courts' dismissal on pleadings). Cf. Carleton v.
Vermont Dairy Herd Improvement Ass'n., Inc., 782 F. Supp. 926, 934 (D. Vt.
1991) (plaintiff's claim that market dominating milk testing organization
disapproved his milk without subjecting it to a fair test stated claim under rule
of reason); McCreery Angus Farms v. American Angus Ass'n, 379 F. Supp.
1008, 1018 (S.D. Ill.), aff'd mem., 506 F.2d 1404 (7th Cir. 1974) (granting
preliminary injunction against enforcement of plaintiff's suspension resulting
from dispute over blood typing; emphasizing denial of due process or any
effective right to challenge association decision making or even obtain a
clear statement of the problem). Contrast Eliason Corp. v. Nat. Sanitation
Found., 614 F.2d 126 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 826 (1980) (approving
standard setting program that did not attempt to exclude disapproved
products from the market or test them in a discriminatory fashion).

Hovenkamp, Standards and Antitrust

Page 14

product and would have not ordinarily have any incentive to keep a safe,
efficient heater off the market. Indeed, they might share liability for fires
caused by unsafe heaters. Further, while control of the natural gas industry
by a burner maker or even a cartel of them is possible, it is quite unlikely and
almost certain to be apparent to a fact finder.
This suggests that an early inquiry in challenges to exclusionary
standard setting should be structural, asking whether the defendants (or a
controlling number of them) are likely to have anticompetitive incentives. The
Seventh Circuit's Moore decision suggests the proper approach. The plaintiff
made a submersible tail light for boat trailers, which was excluded by an
association of boat trailer manufacturers because of a tendency to short
out.34 The court found no antitrust violation, observing that the plaintiff tail
light manufacturer did not compete with the trailer makers who controlled the
association, and that trailer manufacturers would have no incentive to place
an anticompetitive restraint on tail light manufacturers. They wished only to
purchase safe tail lights that complied with federal specifications.35

As with standard setting intended to facilitate collusion, the number of
players can be relevant. If the firms in a market are so numerous that
collusion is impossible then they may have little incentive to exclude another
34. Moore v. Boating Industry Ass'ns., 819 F.2d 693 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
484 U.S. 854 (1987).
35. Id. at 699:
Manufacturers of boat trailers, some of which are members of TMA,
are customers for trailer lamps. The trailer manufacturers do not make
lamps. There is no competition between lamp and trailer
manufacturers. The latter are the customers of the former.... It would
seem to make no difference to a trailer manufacturer from whom he
bought lamps, so long as they complied with federal safety standards
and thus did not expose the trailer manufacturer to federal penalties of
fines and recalls.
See also M & H Tire Co., Inc. v. Hoosier Racing Tire Corp., 733 F.2d 973,
980 (1st Cir. 1984) (track owners excluding plaintiff had no financial interest
in tire production); Jessup v. AKC, Inc., 61 F.Supp.2d 5, 6 (S.D.N.Y. 1999),
aff=d mem., 210 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1072 (2001)
(rejecting antitrust challenge to breed standards; AKC "does not compete or
engage in the breeding, selling or showing of" Labrador Retrievers).
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firm. However, even firms who are behaving competitively vis-a-vis one
another have an incentive to exclude lower cost or superior technologies
from the market, particularly if they themselves cannot readily obtain access
to the technology. Even if the slide rule market contains 100 firms who
compete aggressively on price and slide rule design, these firms still have an
incentive to keep electronic calculators off the market if they believe that the
calculators constitute a major competitive threat to the demand for slide
rules. For example, the standard setting organization in the Allied Tube case
contained several thousand members.36 In that case a manufacturer of steel
electric conduit, fearing that the plaintiff's plastic conduit was both cheaper
and superior, organized a cartel that manipulated the standard setting
process so as to disapprove the plastic conduit. In this case the numerosity
of the membership did not mitigate competitive concerns because the
concern was not price fixing but rather the removal of a threatening, superior
product from the market. Someone who wanted to cheat on the cartel could
not surreptitiously flood the market with the excluded product.
Standard Making and Unilateral Acts by Dominant Firms
In markets where interfirm compatibility is valuable dominant firms (or
dominant cartels or coalitions) typically profit by maintaining incompatibility
with rivals. By maintaining incompatibility a dominant firm protects itself from
new entry or raises the costs of its rivals -- thus, for example, Microsoft's
efforts to ensure that the Windows operating system would not become
compatible with rival operating systems or that new rival systems be
permitted to emerge.37 By contrast, survival or growth for a nondominant
firm may require it to become compatible with the dominant firm's
technology.38
36. Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 494
(1988). According to its website the National Fire Protection Association, or
NFPA, has 79,000 members today. See NFPA.org. The number involved in
the vote to disapprove plastic conduit was 784, and the conduit was
disapproved by a vote of 394 to 390. See 486 U.S. at 497.
37. See, e.g., United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F.Supp.2d 30, 44 (D.D.C.
2000) (conclusions of law), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir.
2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 952 (2001) (speaking of Microsoft's efforts to
prevent Sun Microsystem's Java from becoming a medium that would make
rival operating systems more compatible with Microsoft Windows).
38. See 3A Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law &776 (2d
ed. 2002).
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Exceptions exist to both of these rules. First, a dominant firm may
decide to open its architecture, believing it can earn more from marketwide
acceptance and licensing. IBM made this decision with respect to the
personal computer architecture in the early 1980s. Second, even a
nondominant firm, such as Apple computer, might wish to preserve
incompatibility in a product differentiated market if it occupies a profitable
market niche.
In monopolized markets "standard setting" often refers to nothing
more than the dominant firm's selection of a standard, which other firms are
largely obliged to accept or else be relegated to small niches. For example,
once Kodak, a film monopolist, selects a format for its Instamatic, cartridgeloading camera-and-film system, rival camera makers such as Berkey Photo
may have very little choice but to design a compatible camera.39
Should a dominant firm's unilateral selection of a standard be grounds
for antitrust liability when the de facto result is that the selected standard
becomes the market standard, perhaps raising the costs of rivals or in
extreme cases excluding them altogether? Antitrust does not condemn "no
fault" monopolization. About the closest we have ever come is an "essential
facility" doctrine that may force a firm to share a technology that is essential
for market access. The Supreme Court's 2004 Trinko decision leaves few
opportunities for use of that doctrine.40 A corollary would seem to be that a
firm selecting a technology for its own products has no duty to protect its
rivals' market by ensuring the compatibility of their competing or
complementary products.
The essential facility doctrine speaks of the terms under which a firm
may be required to share an existing technology. However, the intentional
selection of a technology that excludes rivals is a more aggressive act. One
might say that, while a firm has no duty to share its resources or inputs, it
39. Berkey Photo v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 287 (2d Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980) (rejecting claim that Kodak had an
antitrust obligation to "predisclose" its design so that rivals could invent
around it and have copies ready by the time the product was introduced).
Accord California Computer Prods. v. IBM (CalComp), 613 F.2d 727 (9th Cir.
1979) (IBM's design of personal computer with integrated components forced
rivals to adopt the same technology).
40. Verizon Communic., Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S.
398 (2004).
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does have an obligation not to adopt a standard that excludes rivals
unnecessarily. But antitrust tribunals cannot be in the business of making
technology choices for firms. Further, product complementarity is a common
feature of technologically sophisticated products, and incompatibility is often
a consequence of technological success. If Kodak's Instamatic film system
had been a flop, a rival camera maker would be unlikely to complain about its
inability to produce complementary products.41
Another reason for deferring to the technology choice of the dominant
firm is that typically the old technology remains available. In that case
consumers are not injured by the dominant firm's innovation because they
can still purchase the older product; they simply fail to obtain the full benefit
of competition in the new technology. To be sure, this is not necessarily the
case. Kodak might simultaneously introduce its Instamatic film system and
withdraw from the older film format, thus forcing all consumers to the new
technology. But it is difficult to claim that consumers are injured by a new,
monopolized technology when the existing technology remains fully in place.
About all we can say is that consumers lose the ability to migrate to the new
technology at the competitive price.
One might rationally conclude that a completely unilateral technology
choice that becomes an industry standard should never be the basis for an
antitrust claim, no matter how much damage the technology choice does to
rivals. Among the range of positions that one could take on this issue, I
believe this would be better than any position that required juries to make
substantive technological judgments (except in very clear cases) or that tried
to discern the defendant's intent. It would clearly be better than any rule that
required court's to make substantive ex post assessments about the
consumer benefits that result from a particular technological choice.
Innovation always occurs under great uncertainty, and not every successfully
marketed innovation is a clear winner for consumer welfare.
However, a rule of complete nonliability probably goes too far.
Situations exist where firms set out to re-design products for no other
purpose (objectively measured) than to make rival technologies
incompatible. The C.R. Bard case in the Federal Circuit may have been
such a situation.42 The defendant was the dominant manufacturer of a
patented biopsy gun used for taking skin samples. The gun itself was
41. See Berkey Photo, supra.
42. C.R. Bard v. M3 Systems, 157 F.3d 1340 (Fed.Cir. 1998), cert. denied,
526 U.S. 1130 (1999).
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durable but used disposable needles that captured and enclosed tiny pieces
of human skin, which could then be sent to the laboratory. The needles had
been unpatented and were made by numerous manufacturers, subject only
to the requirement that their connection end be structurally compatible with
the collar on the gun. The defendant then redesigned the collar and
developed a new patented needle43 that was the only one compatible with
the gun. The jury rejected the defendant's argument that the re-designed
gun collar and needle were a technological improvement.44
Assuming the strongest case -- namely, that the dominant firm
intentionally re-designed its dominant product in such a way that it was not
an improvement at all, but simply moved complementary products from a
competitive to a monopolized environment -- one might wish to preserve
some basis for antitrust liability. Of course, one still needs to ask how a
dominant firm can "monopolize" by making a complementary product
incompatible with that of rivals. The so-called "leverage" theory of tying
arrangements, which was that tying of monopolized and competitive
products turned one monopoly into two, was discredited in the literature a
half century ago.45 Kodak or Bard can earn all the monopoly profits available
in their markets by setting a monopoly price for the camera or biopsy gun.
They cannot make a larger monopoly profit simply by monopolizing the
complementary product as well.
One reason a firm in Kodak's or C.R. Bard's position might try to
create incompatibility in complementary products is to further price
discrimination. If the value that users place on the biopsy gun is a function of
how often they use it, then Bard can charge a higher price for needles and
earn greater returns from high intensity users than from low intensity users.
Price discrimination itself is not a good reason for condemning such a
practice, because its welfare consequences are so indeterminant. Such a
price discrimination scheme is likely to increase rather than reduce the output
of biopsy guns, thus making it a poor candidate for a claim of
Further, the profitability of even inefficient price
monopolization.46
43. Actually, the new patent was a combination patent covering the gun plus
the needle. See id., 157 F.3d at 1347.
44. C.R. Bard, 157 F.3d at 1382.
45. Ward Bowman, Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67
Yale L.J. 19 (1957). See Herbert Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust Policy, note
12 at '10.6a.
46. For example, under the older technology Bard would charge everyone
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discrimination schemes does not necessarily depend on the exclusion of a
rival. Section 2 of the Sherman Act is not a mandate to the courts to
condemn economically efficient practices, but only those practices that are
unreasonably exclusionary.
But there are other explanations. For example, viable competition in
the market for the complementary product may provide the platform for entry
into the market for the primary product. Or alternatively, innovation by rivals
in the complementary product may increase the likelihood that alternative
technologies will emerge. For example, the concern in Microsoft was not
that Microsoft wanted to exclude Netscape in order to charge higher prices
for either Windows or Internet Explorer. Rather, it was that a viable
Netscape complemented with Java would increase the compatibility between
Windows and rival operating systems, or else facilitate the emergence of
rival platforms.47 If that should happen Microsoft might be relegated to one
among many players in a product differentiated operating system market. As
is so often the case in antitrust, such concerns are highly specific to the
industry. As a result, one hesitates to adopt overly categorical rules in either
direction.
Another issue concerns the firm that participates in a standard setting
process while withholding information about IP rights that it has or is in the
process of perfecting. While the facts vary, in the typical case the firm waits
until the standard has been adopted and then surprises participants by
asserting the IP right and demanding royalties from those that cannot comply
with the standard without infringement.
Antitrust remedies for unilateral conduct are appropriate only for
monopolization. This does not mean that antitrust should never intervene
when such abuses occur, but it must stick to its insistence on power and
anticompetitive effects. At the other extreme, it is incorrect to conclude that
antitrust does not apply because under the antitrust laws a firm is free to
the profit-maximizing price for the gun because it has no control over the
needles, which are sold in a competitive market. Under the new scheme it
might charge less than the monopoly price for the gun, or even give it away,
but place all or part of the overcharge in the needles. As a result, low
intensity users unwilling to pay the old monopoly price will be able to
purchase the gun, and of course Bard will earn even more from high intensity
users who consumer a large number of needles. See Hovenkamp, Federal
Antitrust Policy, note 12 at '10.6e.
47. See Hovenkamp, Antitrust Enterprise, note 3 at 292-298.
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refuse to license its patents.48 That position confuses two issues. One is the
fact that a "mere" refusal to license is not an antitrust violation.49 The other is
that compulsory licensing of patents is a common remedy for conduct that
has been found to violate the antitrust laws.50
Nevertheless a misrepresentation rises to the level of an antitrust
violation only when it permits the offender to dominate a market, or creates a
dangerous probability that this will occur. Or to say it different, the
misrepresentation satisfies the conduct component of the offense of
monopolization or attempt to monopolize, but the structural component of the
offense must also be proven, as well as causation.51 Proving structure may
require a showing that the standard dominates a relevant market, and also
that the patent is either necessary for meeting the standard or that the costs
of meeting it without infringing the patent are higher.
As a result, doctrines derived from the patent laws, such as equitable
estoppel, or even contract law are generally more appropriate for addressing
such holdup problems.52 Most importantly, standard setting processes must
48. See, e.g., Townshend v. rockwell Intl. Corp., 2000 WL 433505, 2000-1
Trade Cas. &72890, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d 1011 (N.D.Cal. March 28, 2000)
(reasoning from premise that the antitrust laws do not impose a duty to
license to conclusion that alleged fraudulent misrepresentation before a
standard setting body did not violate the antitrust laws when the requested
remedy involved compelled licensing).
49. See Hovenkamp, Janis & Lemley, note 2, Ch. 13. Compulsory licensing
is a rarity in patent law, although there are some exceptions. For example,
an unused 1970 amendment in the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. '7608, provides
that the Attorney General can seek judicially supervised compulsory
licensing of patented technology necessary to achieve clean air standards,
where such licensing might be needed to avoid giving the patentee a
monopoly.
50. Contrast &709 and &710 in 3 Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp
Antitrust Law (2d ed. 2002).
51. See Hovenkamp, et al, IP and Antitrust, '35.5b.
52. See Rambus Inc. v. Infineon Technologies Ag, 318 F.3d 1081 (Fed. Cir.
2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 874 (2003) (refusing to find a duty to disclose
under state common law of fraud; also finding that standard could be met
without infringing Rambus' patent claims); Wang Labs v. Mitsubishi elecs.,
103 F.3d 157 (Fed. Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 818 (1997) (patentee
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be defined in such a way as to give firms incentives to disclose their IP
claims and place a price on them in advance of adoption, after which the
exercise of market power is typically far more likely.53 Failures are probably
best addressed via the institutional design of standard setting procedures,
including predisclosure obligations, rather than by antitrust.
Government Involvement in Anticompetitive Standard Setting
Federal and state governments are the largest standard setters in the
economy. The vast majority of these standards are readily available for
private appropriation and completely consistent with competition. For
example, government agencies might define a standard for grade A milk or
prime beef, bar passage and licensing of attorneys, or safety of electrical
components. Any firm or person who can comply with the standards may
lawfully sell in the market.54
equitably estopped from asserting a patent when it had encouraged others to
adopt a standard containing the patent); accord Stambler v. Diebold, 1988
WL 95479, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d 1709 (E.D.N.Y. 1988), aff'd mem., 878 F.2d 1445
(Fed. Cir. 1989) (patentee who knew it had patent covering standard
adopted in procedure in which it participated, and who kept silent, later
equitably estopped from enforcing the patent); Symbol Technologies, Inc. v.
Proxim Inc., 2004 WL 1770290 (D.Del. Jul 28, 2004) (refusing to assert
equitable estoppel where patentee did not mislead other participant in
standard setting process about the existence of its patents). See also in re
Dell Computer Corp., No. 93-10097 (F.T.C. 1995) (consent decree under
which Dell agreed not to assert IP rights when it had represented in
standard-setting process that it in fact had no such rights). Cf. in re Rambus,
Inc., FTC No. 9302 (Feb. 24, 2004), an initial decision in which the
administrative law judge held that a firm could withhold information about
pending patent applications even when the standard setting process in which
it was participating required disclosure. These issues are thoroughly
explored in Hovenkamp, Janis & Lemley, note 2, at '35.5b. See also Mark
A. Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights and Standard Setting Organizations,
90 Cal.L.Rev. 1889 (2002).
53. See Daniel G. Swanson and William J. Baumol, Reasonable and
Nondiscriminatory (RAND) Royalties, Standards Selection and Control of
Market Power, 73 Antitrust L.J. 1 (2005).
54. For example, the standards for electrical components at issue in Allied
Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 494 (1988), were
placed in local government building codes.
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Claims that direct government involvement in private standard setting
is anticompetitive typically arise in one of two ways. In the first, some
governmental or quasi-governmental entity adopts a standard put forward by
private firms and claimed by rivals to be anticompetitive. Such an action can
implicate the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, which declares that qualifying
petitions to the government cannot be antitrust violations, even if the intent or
effect of the requested action is anticompetitive. For example, in the
Columbia case the city of Columbia, South Carolina, adopted a land use
standard regulating the size and spacing of billboard signs that favored the
signs of a politically favored business firm and excluding those of a rival.55
The Supreme Court applied the historical Noerr rule that private parties have
a right, essentially protected by the First Amendment, to petition the
government for even anticompetitive actions. Rivals cannot use antitrust
suits to challenge the legislation or executive action that results. Indeed, the
Noerr case itself was about a standard-setting campaign by railroads to
induce the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to impose cost-increasing
standards on truckers, which were competing with the railroads for freight
business.56 The history of regulation is fairly filled with the efforts of this or
that interest group to impose restrictive standards on rivals that either
increase the rivals' costs or remove their competition from the market
altogether.57
Significantly, Noerr protects the petitioning process by which
anticompetitive government regulation is made. However, it does not protect
the marketplace results of that process. For example, if a group of
businesses petition a legislature for a statute that gives them the authority to
55. City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 499 U.S. 365
(1991).
56. Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc.,
365 U.S. 127, 130 (1961).
57. E.g., Cogeneration, Inc. v. Florida Power & Light Co., 76 F.3d 1560
(11th Cir.), modified on reh'g., 86 F.3d 1028 (11th Cir. 1996) (government
restrictions on power co-generation); Christian Memorial Cultural Center v.
Michigan Funeral Directors Assn., 998 F.Supp. 772 (E.D.Mi. 1998)
(regulations directed at discount funeral services); Certification in
Occupational Therapy, Inc. v. American Occupational Therapy Assn., 24
F.Supp.2d 494 (D. Md. 1998) (legislative adoption of licensing restrictions on
occupational therapists). See 1 Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp,
Antitrust Law &&201-204 (3d ed. 2006).
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exclude competition by setting standards Noerr would protect their right to
obtain this legislation. However, under the antitrust "state action" doctrine
private conduct approved by that statute could still be challenged unless it
was "actively supervised" by a public official or agency.58 The same thing
generally applies to federal regulatory standards: private standard setting
promulgated under such regimes is not immunized from the antitrust laws
unless the relevant federal agency exercises sufficient oversight over the
conduct.59
Finally, Noerr may not protect a firm that gives false information which
distorts the process by which a government standard is created or applied.60
The previously discussed standards holdup problem can implicate Noerr
when the standard maker is the government. For example, in Unocal a firm
allegedly proposed standards for low emission fuel to a state air quality
agency while surreptitiously perfecting patent claims that covered those very
58. Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94 (1988) (physician discipline by peers;
inadequate state supervision); Pinhas v. Summit Health, Ltd., 894 F.2d 1024,
1030 (9th Cir. 1989), aff'd on other grounds, 500 U.S. 322 (1991) (private
standard setting for surgical procedures; inadequate supervision); Jiricko v.
Coffeyville Memorial Hosp. Medical Center, 700 F. Supp. 1559 (D. Kan.
1988) (similar; peer review).Cf. Health Care Equalization Comm. v. Iowa
Medical Socy., 851 F.2d 1020, 1027 (8th Cir. 1988) (immunizing exclusion of
chiropractors from insurance coverage pursuant to medical society
accreditation decision; state official supervised the process); Earles v. State
Bd. of Certified Public Accountants of Louisiana, 139 F.3d 1033 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 525 U.S. 982 (1998) (state board setting accountancy
standards is "state itself" and needs no supervision).
59. E.g., Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 357 (1963)
(unsupervised discipline by NYSE, a private group). See also MCI
Communic. Corp. v. AT&T Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1102 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 891 (1983) (AT&T's unilateral setting of standards for
interconnection by competing carriers not immunized when it was not
sufficiently supervised by regulatory agency); Litton Sys., Inc. v. American
Tel. & Tel. Co., 700 F.2d 785, 807 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
1073 (1984) (similar).
60. E.g., Israel v. Baxter Laboratories, Inc., 466 F.2d 272, 279 (D.C. Cir.
1972) (misrepresentations to FDA as part of drug approval process). Cf. St.
Joseph's Hosp., Inc. v. Hospital Corp. of America, 795 F.2d 948, 955 (11th
Cir. 1986) (misrepresentations in application for certificate of need for new
medical facility).

Hovenkamp, Standards and Antitrust

Page 24

standards.61 Then, once the standards were adopted, it surprised rivals with
the patents and requested large license fees.62
As in the case of purely private standard setting, antitrust liability in
holdup cases should be reserved for the relatively rare situation in which
there is a clear misrepresentation to the government standard maker and
clear evidence that the agency relied on the misrepresentation in setting its
standard. In addition, the usual structural requirements for an antitrust
violation must also be met. Noerr protects a right to petition the government,
but not the right to make false statements to a government decision maker.
And, of course, one does not even get to these issues unless it is clear that
the resulting standard plus the defendant's IP rights create a clear likelihood
of monopoly pricing. This could occur if the IP rights effectively excluded
other firms from making the product subject to the standard and if that
exclusion made it impossible for rival firms to compete effectively. Once
again, the case for a patent law remedy such as equitable estoppel is at least
as strong here as it is in the case of the private standard setting
61. Union Oil Co., ___ F.T.C. ___, 5 CCH Trade Reg. Rep. &15618 (FTC,
July 6, 2004).
62. As the FTC observed:
Awareness of potential competitive harm is particularly important in
settings like the one presented here. Government regulations such as
CARB's standards may impose potent entry barriers capable of
preserving market power over extended periods of time. Whereas an
exercise of unprotected market power may sow the seeds of its own
erosion if firms are free to enter and compete on equal terms with the
incumbent, governmentally-enforced limits on entry may impede and
even prevent that process. Consequently, misrepresentations that
distort government decision making in ways that create or shield
market power may inflict severe and long-lasting public harm. Such
considerations support our conclusion that the substantial public
interest in antitrust enforcement may outweigh countervailing policy
reservations when those concerns are sufficiently muted.
(citations omitted).
The dispute was eventually resolved by a consent decree in which the
FTC approved a merger between Unocal and Chevron, and Unocal agreed
to
dedicate
the
disputed
patents
to
the
public.
See
http://www.unocal.com/uclnews/2005news/061005.htm (press release).
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organization.63
Conclusion
Given the ubiquity of standard setting in our economy and its
undisputed promotion of social welfare, claims of anticompetitive standard
setting must be scrutinized very closely. Further, antitrust law is a fairly blunt
instrument for dealing with such claims. Except in easy cases, antitrust fact
finders lack the sophistication to pass judgment on the substantive merits of
a standard. In any event, antitrust is not a roving mandate to question bad
standards. It requires an injury to competition, and whether the minimum
conditions for competitive harm are present can often be determined without
examining the substance of the standard itself.
When government involvement in standard setting is substantial
antitrust challenges should generally be rejected. The petitioning process in
a democratic system protects even bad legislative judgments from collateral
attack. In any event, antitrust's purpose is to correct private markets. It is
not a general corrective for political processes that have gone awry. The
best case for antitrust liability in this context occurs when the government
has somehow been deceived into adopting a standard that it would not have
adopted had it known the true facts. Even then, nonantitrust remedies such
as equitable estoppel are probably a superior solution.

63. However, see Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Immunex Corp., 84
F.Supp.2d 574 (D.N.J. 2000), which concluded that because Noerr protected
a firm's right to obtain an exclusive license based on alleged
misrepresentations to the government, promissory estoppel based on same
alleged misrepresentations could not be used to prevent it from enforcing
those rights.

